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INTRODUCTION
First enacted in 1789 as part of the Federal
Judiciary Act,' the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) provides
original jurisdiction to the federal district courts for any
civil action (1) brought by an alien, (2) claiming damages
sounding only in tort, (3) resulting from a violation of
international law.2 This peculiar statute lay dormant until
twenty years ago when two Paraguayan nationals
successfully utilized it to sue a former Paraguayan official
for the torture and extrajudicial killing of their son in
Paraguay.3
Since that time, other similar cases have been
brought against foreign officials alleging war crimes such
1 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
2 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1996).
3 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Alien Tort Claims Act
as genocide, murder, and other crimes against humanity
with varying success. The increased use of the ATCA,
however, has not come without controversy. Specifically,
there has been much debate as to whether the statute
provides for a federal private right of action, or whether the
statute merely grants jurisdiction.5 As a corollary, it has
also been debated that if the ATCA does provide for a
private right of action, it does so only for those actions
contemplated at the time of the statute's promulgation. This
would limit the statute's application to piracy, offenses
against foreign ambassadors, and violations of safe
conducts.6
In June 2004, the United States Supreme Court in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain held that the ATCA does provide
a statutory right of action for aliens beyond those originally
contemplated in 1789. Specifically, the Court held that
actionable violations under the ATCA must "rest on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world,"
and must be "defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized."8 In other words, to state a claim under the
ATCA after Sosa, such a claim must be consistent with the
4 See Kadic, 70 F.3d 232; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343
F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
s See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780 ("Judge Bork ... reasons as
follows: (a) international law grants plaintiffs no express right to sue in
a municipal court; (b) for numerous reasons, primarily related to
separation of powers, it would be inappropriate to imply one; (c) since
Section 1350 requires that international law give plaintiffs a cause of
action, and it does not, we cannot find jurisdiction ...In [Judge
Edwards] view, the first two steps in the analysis are irrelevant and the
third step is erroneous.")
6See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
8 Id.
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content and international recognition of eighteenth century
norms prohibiting piracy.9 Significantly, the Sosa Court
expressly left open the question of private liability under
the ATCA.'
0
Hence, the issue of private liability, and thus
corporate liability, remains almost completely unresolved.
In most cases, a litigant may use the ATCA only when
implicating some measure of state conduct." However,
certain acts, such as genocide, war crimes, slavery, and
forced labor, may be alleged against private actors because
their commission provokes a "universal concern"
regardless of the perpetrator.12 Such conduct has been held
actionable under the ATCA absent state action because it
violates a set of international law standards known as jus
cogens norms. 13  These norms are defined as: "[a]
mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law
accepted and recognized by the international community as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted."' 14 Thus,
the jus cogens norms contemplate the existence of certain




'0 Id. at 733 n.20.
" See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795.
12 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-41.
13 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 954 (9th Cir.
2002), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (vacating district court opinion after granting
parties' stipulated motion to dismiss); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
14 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
1S See I M. CHERW BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 40 (2d ed. 1999) ("a jus cogens norm holds the highest
hierarchical position among all other norms and principles. As a
consequence of that standing, jus cogens norms are deemed to be
'peremptory' and 'non-derogable.' ").
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Under the state action requirement, claims brought
under the ATCA against private individuals, like.
corporations, have been subject to an even higher standard
of scrutiny than those brought against state actors.'
6
However, absent a showing that a private actor has violated
a jus cogens norm, the state action requirement can be
circumvented by a showing that a lesser violation occurred
in furtherance of genocide, war crimes, or forced labor.1
7
For example, in 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that state action was not required to implicate oil giant
Unocal for torture, rape and murder, because these events
occurred in furtherance of a forced labor program in
connection with a Unocal-built pipeline.s Although the
state action requirement has been somewhat emasculated
by the Ninth Circuit's approach, it continues to be a
significant hurdle to stating an ATCA claim. As will be
discussed further below, the state action requirement does
not serve any legitimate function in ATCA jurisprudence or
under international law. Moreover, the requirement
enables corporate entities to act outside of international
legal norms without incurring any liability.
Part I of this Note addresses the background and
development of ATCA jurisprudence leading up to the
Supreme Court's decision in Sosa. Part I also briefly
outlines the history of customary international law from
1789 to the present day in an effort to flesh out the shift in
international law from a state's responsibilities to other
16 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-41; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795.
17 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243-44; Doe, 395 F.3d at 946
(reasoning that forced labor is "a modem variant of slavery," therefore
not requiring state action to create ATCA liability).
" Doe, 396 F.3d at 946 (holding that although there were
genuine issues of material fact with respect to Unocal's aiding and
abetting acts of murder and rape, the record did not "contain sufficient
evidence to support Plaintiffs' claims of torture").
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states, to responsibilities on actors public and private to
maintain and promote individual human rights. Part II
focuses exclusively on the Sosa decision, and Part III
examines the validity of the state action requirement in
light of the Supreme Court's silence on the issue in Sosa.
Specifically, Part III addresses whether the state action
requirement occupies a legitimate place in ATCA
jurisprudence and international law given the current
emphasis on individual human rights in customary
international law. The requirement, which does not
originate from the language of the ATCA but rather from
federal common law, has been significantly eroded by
Ninth and Second Circuit decisions allowing ATCA
jurisdiction for violations committed by purely private
actors.
This Note also addresses the similarities between
modem-day private liability under the ATCA and the
paradigm ATCA offense of piracy and concludes by
discussing the implications of removing the state action
requirement from ATCA jurisprudence. Thus, this Note
attacks the validity of the state action requirement in ATCA
jurisprudence and, by doing so, argues that the ATCA
should have a greater role in policing transnational
corporate conduct that infringes on human rights
established under international law.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
In 1789, the first Congress of the United States
passed the Federal Judiciary Act granting jurisdictional
power to the newly created federal district courts. 19 What
has come to be known as the Alien Tort Claims Act began
as a portion of the Federal Judiciary Act stating that federal
district courts "shall also have cognizance, concurrent with
'9 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
Alien Tort Claims Act
the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the
case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort
only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. 2 °
The ATCA was drafted in part to address the
Continental Congress' incapacity to handle incidents
affecting diplomatic relationships. 2 1  The Framers
contemplated that America's newfound independence
brought with it the responsibility to embrace and enforce
international legal norms as part of the American legal
system.22  Recognizing this duty, the first Congress
understood that federal courts must be empowered to hear
cases involving the violation of such international legal
norms even where the victims were not American
citizens. 23 The ATCA was intended to allow aliens access
to federal courts to prevent any cause of action, if
mishandled in state court, from developing into an
international crisis.24  The underlying presumption, of
course, was that state courts might deny justice to aliens
20 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
21 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715-16, ("The Continental Congress was
hamstrung by its inability to 'cause infractions of treaties, or of the law
of nations to be punished"') (quoting J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed., 1893)).
22 Id. at 714. ("'When the United States declared their
independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modem state of purity and refinement."') (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3
DalI. 199, 281 (1796)).
23 Id. at 715. ("The law of nations included a second, more
pedestrian element, however, that did fall within the judicial sphere, as
a body ofjudge-made law regulating the conduct of individuals situated
outside domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an international
savor.").
24 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 (noting that under international
law, "states are obliged to make civil courts of justice accessible for
claims made by foreign subjects against individuals within the states
territory" in order to avoid an "international confrontation").
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thus necessitating the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
hear such disputes regardless of the amount in
controversy.25
According to William Blackstone, whose writings
had a deep influence on the jurisprudential thought of the
era, a very small subset of international legal norms existed
that, when violated, provoked the diplomatic
responsibilities of a nation-state to provide judicial
recourse. 26  Those violations, as contemplated by the
principle drafter of the ATCA, were violations "of safe
conducts and passports," infractions upon the immunity of
ambassadors and piracy.27 In its current state, the ATCA
reads in full: "[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."
28
A. A Brief History of Customary International Law
The phrase "customary international law" simply
refers to international law that arises from non-treaty
sources.2 9 The origins and original purpose of the ATCA
reflect the statist nature of customary international law in
1789.30 At that time, responsibilities under international
Id.
26 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715 (noting that there was a "sphere in
which... rules binding individuals for the benefit of other individuals
overlapped with the norms of state relationships").
27 Id. at 719. The Sosa Court realized that the apparent
principle drafter of the ATCA, Oliver Ellsworth, "was attentive enough
to the law of nations to recognize" Blackstone's three principle
offenses.
2328 U.S.C. § 1350.
2 Flores, 343 F.3d at 143 (stating that the 'law of nations' is
commonly referred to as international law and when limited to non-
treaty law, is referred to as customary international law).
30 See generally Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law:
Alien Tort Claims Act
law were principally based on a nation's relationship with
other nations. During the era when the ATCA was drafted,
nation-states were responsible under international law, in
large part, for the conduct of their own citizens on the high
seas, for providing equitable treatment for foreign citizens
in their judicial system, and for providing reparations to
foreign citizens harmed within their borders.3' If citizen
was harmed by a foreign government, the enforcement of
his claim was within the complete control of his respective
government. 32  In other words, individuals had no legal
personality under international law.
In the wake of World War II and the punishment of
war criminals in Nuremburg and Tokyo, the role of the
individual under international law began to shift.33 In an
effort to ensure that the atrocities committed by Nazi
Germany were not repeated, the international community
began to codify rights and responsibilities under
international law for both state and private actors.
34
Initially, the work of the Nuremburg International Military
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L.
REv. 1 (1982) (arguing that "individuals are no longer mere objects,
mere pawns in the hands of the state").
31 Id. at 2-5.
32 Id. See also Ian Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in
International Law, 50 VA.L.REv. 435, 436 (1964) (noting that the
individual's place under international law at the end of the eighteenth
century was one of "subjection").
33 Id. at 9. See also Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to
Failed State: International Protection from Human Rights Abuses by
Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 81, 89 (1999) (stating
"[a] prodigious body of customary human rights norms dating back
several centuries reached a certain critical mass after World War II").34 Id. See also Brownlie, supra note 32, at 437 ("World War I,
the spread of national aspirations, the Russian revolution, the crisis of
fascism, and the planned destruction of four and a half million Jews
gave impetus, each in its own way, to attempts to give increased
protection to both individuals and oppressed communities").
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Tribunal, which held individuals responsible for the state-
sponsored holocaust, had a tremendous impact on the
notion of private liability under international law.
35
Similarly, the U.N. Charter, which was drafted during this
period, codified a set of natural law rights inalienable to all
humans.36  The U.N. Charter, as part of this "first
generation of human rights," recognized the duty of the
United Nations to preserve and promote certain
fundamental freedoms consistent with our Constitution's
guarantees to life and liberty. 37 The Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, also drafted in the wake of World War II,
was designed to protect individuals from arbitrary actions
committed on behalf of governmental and private entities.
38
Although the U.N. Charter, Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, and similar documents have been criticized as
aspirational guidelines lacking enforcement mechanisms,
39
these documents and their progeny illustrate a significant
shift in international law by providing international
protection for individual human rights. These documents
demonstrate an international consensus that certain
33 H. Knox Thames, Forced Labor and Private Liability in
U.S. Courts, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT'L. L. 153, 188 (2000) (quoting Edward
M. Wise, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NUREMBURO, IN WAR CRIMEs 59
(Belinda Cooper ed., TV Books 1999)) (noting the profound affect the
Nuremburg Tribunals had on international law).36 See generally U.N. CHARTER.
37 Sohn, supra note 30, at 17.31 Id. at 22.
39 Id. at 12 (noting that the U.N. Charter, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic,
Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant of Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights have been criticized as "soft-law" with no binding or
practical effect). See also Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless
Vise: Codes of Conduct and American Multinational Enterprise, 20 W.
INT'L L. J 89 (2001) (discussing specifically the lack of successful
enforcement mechanisms regulating the conduct of multinational
corporations).
Alien Tort Claims Act
inalienable rights should have equal footing with rights
created by positive law.
40
This initial recognition of the significance of
protecting individual human rights led to an even greater
expansion of the rights recognized under international
law.4' In the last sixty years, the United Nations and other
intergovernmental bodies have recognized economic,
social, and cultural rights and imposed obligations on
private actors to ensure and promote those rights.42 More
recently, the newest generation of human rights has
centered on the collective rights of self-determination,
peace, and development. 43 Thus, there exists an emerging
international consensus that individuals should have the
right to determine the direction and identity of their own
states through their collective will. This newest generation
indicates yet another expansion from the initial
fundamental freedoms recognized by the U.N. Charter.
44
More importantly, this latest generation of rights places
4o Sohn, supra note 30, at 18. See also Jordan J. Paust, The
Other Side of Right: Private Duties under International Law, 5 HARV.
HuM. RTs. J. 51 (1992) (reasoning that various instruments, including
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recognize the rights and duties
of private individuals under international law).
41 See generally Sohn, supra note 30.
42 The importance of the global preservation of human rights
on the health of global peace and democracy was stressed in President
Roosevelt's Four Freedoms Speech during a time that these rights were
beginning to be recognized under international law. President
Roosevelt emphasized that individual citizens' ability to determine
their own cultural, political and economic destinies was vital to world
peace and democracy. See Sohn, supra not 30, at 33 (referencing
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 6,
1941), reprinted in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 2855 (1966)).
43 See Sohn, supra note 30, at 48.
44 See infra note 45.
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individuals, through their shared will, at the very center of
the rights and responsibilities recognized under
international law.45
Although violations of many of the human rights
now recognized under international law will not provoke
the ATCA's jurisdiction, the shift in international law from
the protection of state rights to individual rights places the
ATCA's unearthing in its proper context. The Filartiga
decision, described below, reflects this shift by referencing'
international law under the ATCA not as it existed in 1789,
but rather as it has evolved and currently exists. 46 This
recognition, although potentially undermined by the Sosa
decision, strongly suggests that ATCA jurisprudence
should follow the trend in international law of erasing the
distinction between state and private actors.
B. The Unearthing of the ATCA
Often referred to as a "legal Lohengrin," much of
the ATCA's elusive history is owed to the fact that the
provision was utilized only once in the 170 years after its
enactment.47 As such, the ATCA's original purpose and
applicability have not been assessed outside of the rather
sparse amount of legislative and political history detailed
above.
However, in 1979, a Paraguayan national brought
suit in the Second Circuit under the ATCA seeking redress
45 Much scholarship concerning the right to self-determination
has centered on the wake resulting from the dissolution of the former
Republic of Yugoslavia. See e.g., Antonio Cassese, Self Determination
of Peoples and the Recent Break-Up of USSR and Yugoslavia, in
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 131 (Nijhoff, 1994).
4 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
41 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 ("for over 170 years after its
enactment it provided jurisdiction in only one case").
Alien Tort Claims Act
for the torture and extrajudicial killing of his son in
Paraguay.48 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a Paraguayan
doctor and his wife living in the United States under
political asylum brought suit against a high-ranking
Paraguayan police inspector alleging that their son, Joelito,
was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by Paraguayian officials
in retaliation for his father's political activities. 9 Using the
relevant sources of international law as defined by the
Supreme Court,50 the Second Circuit held that torture,
perpetrated by a state actor, violated generally held norms
of international law, thus warranting the exercise of federal
jurisdiction under the ATCA.51
The success of the plaintiffs in Filartiga ignited a
dispute in the federal judiciary as to whether the ATCA
created a private right of action under "the law of nations,"
or rather, whether the statute merely provided jurisdiction
to hear such disputes.52 This dispute, although resolved by
the Supreme Court in Sosa, is set out by the dialogue
between Judge Edwards and Judge Bork in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic.53  In Tel-Oren, the survivors and
representatives of persons murdered during a Palestine
4s See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
49 Id. at 878.
50 Id. at 880 (noting that that the "law of nations 'may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on
public law; or by general usage and practice of nations; or by the
judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law[,]") (quoting
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820)).
5' Id. at 885 ("[it is] clear that international law confers
fundamental rights upon all people vis-A-vis their own governments.
While the ultimate scope of those rights will be a subject continuing
refinement and elaboration, we hold that the right to be free from
torture is now among them.")
52 Courtney Shaw, Uncertain Justice: Liability of
Multinationals under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1359, 1365-1367 (2002). See generally Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774.
" See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780.
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Liberation Organization ("PLO") attack on an Israeli bus
brought suit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia under the ATCA.54  On appeal, the court of
appeals, sitting as a three-judge panel, unanimously agreed
that given the legitimacy that some acts of terrorism have
under the laws of certain states,55 terrorism cannot be
considered to violate a universally accepted norm of
international law. However, according to Judge Bork, who
concurred in the decision, the issue of whether terrorism
amounted to a violation of the law of nations was a
needless analysis.5 6 Instead, Judge Bork reasoned that the
ATCA did not grant aliens the right to sue except for
claims originally contemplated by Blackstone and the first
Congress. Judge Bork stated that absent legislative or
executive guidance in the form of legislative history,
modem treaty, or executive order, the judiciary should be
powerless to hear disputes which implicate diplomatic
relationships with foreign governments.
14 Id. at 776.
33 Id. at 795 (reasoning that U.N. documents reveal that "to
some states acts of terrorism, in particular those with political motive,
are legitimate acts of aggression and therefore immune from
condemnation.").
56 Id. at 801 ("[j]udge Edwards contends, and the Second
Circuit in Filartiga assumed, that Congress' grant of jurisdiction also
created a cause of action. That seems to me fundamentally wrong and
certain to produce pernicious results. For reasons I will develop, it is
essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause of action before a
private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international law in
a federal tribunal.").
s Id. at 813-14.58 Id. at 816 (reasoning that "unless a modem statute, treaty, or
executive agreement provided a private cause of action for violations of
new international norms which do not themselves contemplate private
enforcement. Then, at least, we would have a current political judgment
about the role appropriate for courts in an area of considerable
international sensitivity.").
Alien Tort Claims Act
According to Judge Edwards, who was writing for
the majority, the legislative history, although sparse,
indicated that the ATCA provided for a federal private right
of action. 59 According to Edwards, the "law of nations"
should not be considered as it existed in 1789, but rather as
it exists in the modem context.60  Using Filartiga, Judge
Edwards reasoned that the ATCA provides for a private
right of action for violations of internationally held norms
that are definable, obligatory, and universal.
61
C. The State Action Requirement
The Tel-Oren court was also the first court to
address the liability of a non-state actor under the ATCA.62
As such, the state action requirement originated in the Tel-
Oren decision.63 The court began its analysis by holding
that private, rather than state, liability was at issue because
the PLO was not recognized by the United States as a
9 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782 (stating "[t]here is evidence.
.. that the intent of the [ATCA] was to assure aliens access to federal
courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state court,
might blossom into an international crisis.").
60 Id. at 781 (stating that persons maybe liable under the ATCA
if they commit "either a crime traditionally warranting universal
jurisdiction or an offense that comparably violates current norms of
international law").
61 Id. ("The point is simply that commentators have begun to
identify a handful of heinous actions--each of which violates
definable, universal and obligatory norms (citations omitted)-and in
the process are defining the limits of section 1350's reach.").
62 Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge:
Developing Enforcement Mechanisms 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 183, 198
(2002) (reasoning that although the state.action requirement originated
in Filartiga, the doctrine was not developed until Tel-Oren because
"the court in Filartiga was not presented with the need to develop an
ATCA-specific state action analysis because the defendant was a
former agent of the government of Paraguay, and was unquestionably a
state actor").
6 See generally id.
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sovereign state. 64  Although the court noted that the
language of the ATCA did not distinguish between state
and private actors, the court refused to endorse individual
responsibility for torture under the ATCA because
"established international law" suggested that states, rather
than private actors, had historically incurred responsibility
under international law.65  Although the Tel-Oren court
recognized that the liability of private actors under
international law was hardly settled,6 6 the court still saw fit
to distinguish Filartiga because the torture at issue in that
case was perpetrated by a state actor. 67  This distinction
drawn by the Tel-Oren court created the common law
requirement of state action that continues to preclude a
significant number of ATCA cases because, in the
estimation of Judge Edwards, the relevant scholarship
failed to indicate an entrenched consensus allowing for
individual responsibility under international law.68  This
inauspicious inception of the state action requirement is
significant given that this requirement finds absolutely no
basis in the statutory text of the ATCA.69
" Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791.
65 Id. at 792, n.22 (noting that "classical international law was
predominantly statist" and thus that "[n]on-state actors could assert
their rights against another state only to the extent that their own state
adopted their claims") (quoting J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS I
(6th ed. 1963)) (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 794 (noting, significantly, that the status of individual
liability under international law has been "in flux" since the ATCA was
drafted and that there was not a currient scholarly consensus on the
issue).
67 Id. at 795 (reasoning that torture is not one of the "handful
of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual
responsibility.").
6 Id. at 794 (noting "that for each article sounding the arrival
of individual rights and duties under the law of nations, another surveys
the terrain and concludes that there is a long distance to go").
6 28 U.S.C. § 1350. It is also significant to note that Judge
Alien Tort Claims Act
In 1996, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
expanded the scope of actionable violations for non-state
actors under the ATCA.70  In Kadic v. Karadzic,71 Croat
and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought claims
under the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection Act
alleging that they were subject to violations of international
law including genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary
execution committed by the former president of a self-
proclaimed and unrecognized Bosnian-Serb Republic.
72
Unlike Tel-Oren, the Kadic court reasoned that a foreign
state need not be formally recognized by other states to be
liable under the ATCA provided that the entity had the
capacity to deal diplomatically with other states.73 The
Kadic court further refined the state action requirement by
recognizing that private parties acting in concert with
foreign states also incur legal responsibility under the
ATCA.74 Although the court ultimately held that the
violations at issue met the state action requirement, the
Kadic court explicitly noted that the law of nations
embraces non-state actors.7 5  Accordingly, the court held
Edwards in Tel-Oren concluded by stating that "the trend in
international law is toward a more expansive allocation of rights and
obligations to entities other than states." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795.70 See Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
71 id.
72 Id. at 236-37.
73 Id at 245. ("It would be anomalous indeed if non-
recognition by the United States, which typically reflects disfavor with
a foreign regime-sometimes due to human rights abuses-had the
perverse effect of shielding officials of an unrecognized regime from
liability for those norms that apply only to state actors.").
74 A significant and uncertain component of ATCA litigation
surrounds the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to construe "color of law" in
terms of the domestic rubrics of actual or apparent agency. See
Collingsworth, supra note 62, at 198.
75 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. ("We do not agree that the law of
nations, as understood in the modem era, confines its reach to state
action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of
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that the commission of genocide, slavery, war crimes, and
piracy all provoke the jurisdiction of the ATCA regardless
of the actor.
7 6
D. ATCA Suits Against Corporate Defendants and the
State Action Requirement
Consistent with the current state of international
law, in recent years, the ATCA has become a tool used by
human rights and environmental groups to police the
activities of multinational corporations.T For example, in
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a
state or only as private individuals.").
76 Id. at 240. The Kadic decision also recognized and dealt
with the issue of the justiciability of disputes under the ATCA. The
Kadic court acknowledged that the adjudication of suits implicates a
greater question of the judiciary's role in judgingthe conduct of foreign
nations that may lead to diplomatic difficulties. The court rejected that
any case involving foreign relations was nonjusticiable and instead
reasoned that if the state action at issue could not be characterized
under the American legal rubrics of "political question" or "act of
state," the conduct may properly provide for a justiciable dispute under
the ATCA. The inherent diplomatic consequences that flow from
ATCA cases continues to be a great source of political and legal
dispute. Id. at 248-251. See infra, notes 207-209 and accompanying
text.
7 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, several other
ATCA cases involving corporate defendants are worth mentioning. For
example, in Aquinda v. Texaco Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002),
30,000 Ecuadorians and 25,000 Peruvians filed suit against Texaco
alleging that the corporation's oil activities in their respective countries
polluted rain forests and rivers. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed the suit based on forum non conveniens. See also Abdullahi
v. Pfizer, 2003 U.S.App.Lexis 20704 (2d Cir., Oct 8, 2003)
(unpublished) (vacating a dismissal of a suit brought by plaintiffs
alleging that Pfizer conducted an unethical pharmaceutical trial on
Nigerian Children and remanding to district court to ascertain whether
Nigerian courts can provide a sufficiently trustworthy alternate forum).
Also, in Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Oil Co. Inc., 256 F. Supp.
2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003), the court held that the plaintiffs' suit
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Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co.,7 8 Nigerian
dmigrds brought suit against two foreign holding
companies alleging that they participated in human rights
abuses against the plaintiffs as reprisal for their opposition
to the company's oil exploration in Nigeria." The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant companies recruited,
planned, instigated, and funded Nigerian military attacks on
local villages and the torture of the plaintiffs because of
their opposition to the defendants' activities on their land.80
Currently, the defendants' liability for summary execution,
crimes against humanity, torture, and other crimes is still
pending after having survived a motion to dismiss in
federal district court. 1 However, in reviewing that motion,
the court carefully noted that the plaintiffs had to
demonstrate that the foregoing claims arose from state
action before proceeding under the ATCA.'2
alleging that Columbian paramilitaries acting at the behest of an
Alabama mining corporation killed their union leaders sufficiently
stated an ATCA claim for extrajudicial killing as well as for "the denial
of the fundamental rights to associate and organize." See also
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, No. 01-3208 (S.D. Fla., filed July 20, 2001)
(allowing ATCA claims against a Columbian Coca-Cola bottling
company for anti-union murder and torture committed by Columbian
paramilitaries). Finally, in Doe v. Gap, Inc., Civ. No. 99-329 (filed
C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 1999), Saipan residents and garment workers
unsuccessfully alleged ATCA claims for debt peonage and slavery
against The Gap and other retailers. The foregoing is merely a taste of
the ATCA cases filed against corporate defendants in recent years.
78 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and Shell Transp. and
Trading Co., PLC, No. 96 CIV. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887 *2
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
79 Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887.
so Id. at *2.
8' Id. at *"12.
82 Id. at *12-13. An earlier disposition of the Wiwa case serves
to illustrate the related issue of forum non conveniens in ATCA
litigation. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 2000). Some courts have expressed a preference to adjudicate
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Corporate defendants have also been implicated for
environmental pollution.83  In Flores v. Southern Peru
Mining Corporation, Peruvian residents brought claims
under the ATCA against an American mining company
alleging that the company's operations caused them serious
ailments.8 4  In so doing, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant mining company had violated their
internationally recognized rights to health, life, and
sustainable development, thus warranting the jurisdiction of
American courts under the ATCA. 5 The Flores court,
using the Filartiga decision as well as other sources of
international law, decided that the rights to life and health
were insufficiently definite to constitute a violation of
customary international law.86 With specific respect to the
plaintiffs' allegations that pollution constituted an
actionable claim under the ATCA, the court held that
because the pollution at issue was confined to Peru, and
thus not international in scope, such pollution did not
embody an actionable claim because relevant sources of
international law did not indicate that intranational
pollution constituted a violation of the law of nations.
8 7
ATCA cases in American courts. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.
Supp. 2d 1116, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). In contrast, the doctrine has
been successfully invoked when a claim is based on wholly foreign
conduct committed by aliens and where the defendant shows that
relevant forum non conveniens factors weigh strongly in favor of the
foreign forum. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106.
? Flores, 343 F.3d 140.
41Id. at 143.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 161 (reasoning that the principles inherent to the right
to life, health and sustainable development are "boundless and
indeterminate").
Id. at 161-62 ("Although customary international law does
not protect a right to life or right to health, plaintiffS' complaint may be
construed to assert a claim under a more narrowly-defined customary
international law rule against intra national pollution. However, the
voluminous documents and affidavits of international law scholars
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Accordingly, the Flores court never reached the issue of
state action.
To date, the most pervasive and significant case
involving the extent of corporate liability for human rights
abuses under the ATCA is John Doe I v. Unocal Corp.ss In
that case, Myanmar villagers brought suit against oil giant
and California corporation Unocal for its alleged
complicity and involvement in human rights abuses
occurring in the vicinity of a Unocal-owned pipeline
project in Myanmar.8 9 The villagers brought suit under the
ATCA, as well as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), alleging that a Unocal
subsidiary hired and directed the Myanmar military and
complied with its use of forced labor, murder, rape, and
torture in connection with Unocal's pipeline project.
9
0
The threshold issue in Doe, as in any case brought
under the ATCA, was whether the plaintiffs had
sufficiently alleged a violation of the law of nations. 91 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the claim of forced
labor, as a modem variant of slavery, was a violation that
warranted liability under the ATCA regardless of the
existence of state action.92 In addition to recognizing a new
violation of international law not subject to the state action
requirement, the Doe court held that the plaintiffs'
submitted by plaintiffs fail to demonstrate the existence of any such
norm under international law.").
n See Doe, 395 F.3d 932.
'9 Id. at 936.
9 Id.
9' Id. at 945.
9 Id. at 946, (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794-95 (reasoning
that because courts have traditionally included forced labor within the
definition of slavery, "forced labor, like traditional variants of slave
trading, is among the 'handful of crimes.., to which the law of nations
attributes individual liability."')
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allegations of torture, rape, and murder were actionable
under the ATCA without the requirement of state action
because they occurred "in furtherance of" a forced labor
program. 93  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that genuine issues of material fact existed
with respect to the plaintiffs' allegations of forced labor,
murder, and rape, and the case was remanded to the district
court.
94
The Doe court also saw fit to prescribe a standard
for the district court to assess Unocal's conduct. 95 Unocal's
conduct, like most corporate involvement in human rights
abuses, was indirect and of a third-party nature. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit was required to determine whether the district
court should evaluate Unocal's conduct on remand under
the recently created International Criminal Court standard
of "aiding and abetting," or employ a domestic third-party
liability standard such as joint enterprise or agency
liability.9 6 Using the Second Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws, the Doe court adopted the international criminal law
standard of "aiding and abetting" because of the
proceeding's international scope and the existence of a
931d. at 954 (The Doe court cited Kadic for the proposition that
"like other crimes, [murder, rape and torture] are 'proscribed by
international law only when committed by state actors or under color of
law' to the extent that they were committed in isolation." ) ( quoting
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243-44).
9 Doe, 395 F.3d at 962-63. The court held that the "record did
not contain sufficient evidence to support the Plaintiffs' claims of
torture." Id. at 956
95 Id. at 946.
9 Id. There is currently a circuit split with regard to this
second issue. Some courts, like the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
have utilized various international law standards while others have
employed domestic substantive tort law. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000). See Doe, 395
F.3d at 963-978 (Reinhardt, S., concurring) (discussing the relative
benefits of using a domestic tort law standard).
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similar standard dating back to the Nuremburg trials.97
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the following
standard: "aiding and abetting liability for knowing,
practical assistance or encouragement which has a
substantial effect on the perpetuation of a crime."
98
Although the standard on which corporate actors will be
judged is especially significant to their ultimate liability
and the issues of this Note, a full discussion is well beyond
its scope. Significantly, although Doe was approved for
rehearing99 in light of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, discussed below, the
parties privately settled prior to the case's rehearing.
II. THE SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN DECISION
A. The Facts
In 1985, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") was captured, detained, tortured, and ultimately
murdered while on assignment in Mexico. °° The DEA,
acting on eyewitness testimony, hired Mexican nationals to
abduct Mexican doctor Humberto Alvarez-Machain
("Machain") who was thought to have prolonged the life of
the DEA agent so as to extend his interrogation and
torture.' 0' Machain was abducted, held overnight, and
97 Doe, 395 F.3d.at 949. The court reasoned that applying an
international law was favorable for three reasons: (1) using the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1969), the court
reasoned that an international standard better "served the needs of an
international system; (2) international law must be considered to
correctly ascertain the relevant policies of the forum; and (3) using the
international law standard created a greater sense of predictability and
certainty. Id.
" Id. at 951.
99 Id at 978.
'0o Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697.
101 Id.
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subsequently brought by private plane to El Paso, Texas,
where he was arrested by federal officers.' °2 After being
acquitted in federal district court, Machain filed a civil
claim against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and against Mexican national Jose Francisco
Sosa under the ATCA. 10 3  The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Machain on his ATCA
claims, reasoning that arbitrary arrest and detention were
violations of clear and universally recognized norms of
international law.1°4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
clarify the scope of the ATCA.
0 5
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court began by exploring the scant
legislative history surrounding the ATCA. l0 6 In so doing,
the Court concluded that the first Congress did not intend
for the ATCA to exist as a mere jurisdictional convenience
for future legislatures to create private rights of action
under its jurisdictional grant. 107  Although the statute is
jurisdictional in nature, the Court opined that the ATCA
was intended to be given practical effect the moment it was
enacted and concluded that the statute provided for a
private right of action.'08  However, the Court could not
Io0 Id. at 698.
103 Id. Machain also initially filed civil claims against a DEA
operative, four DEA agents, and five unnamed Mexican civilians. Id.
'04 Id. at 699.
105Id.
'06 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714-19.
'07 Id. at 720 (noting that although the ATCA's legislative
history is unclear, such history does support that the statute was
intended to provide a right of action "for a relatively modest set" of
claims).
'O'ldat 719 (stating "[T]here is every reason to suppose that
the First Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience
Alien Tort Claims Act
find any historical indication that Congress contemplated
causes of action beyond Blackstone's three primary
offenses: violation of safe conducts, infingements on the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 10 9 The Court also
implicitly adopted the reasoning of Filartiga and its
progeny by interpreting the "law of nations" in the modem
context but qualified the endorsement by requiring any
claim arising from modem international law to be
consistent with the universality and specificity of the
paradigms that characterized eighteenth-century ATCA
claims."10 Specifically, in order to state a claim under the
ATCA after Sosa, such a claim "must have content as
definite as, and an acceptance as widespread as, those
characterized by the 18th century norms prohibiting
piracy." "l' Applying this standard, the Court agreed that
the illegal custody of Machain, which lasted less than one
day, did not violate any universally accepted norms of
international law."1
2
to be placed -on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state
legislature that might, some day, authorize the creation of causes of
action or itself decide to make some element of the law of nations
actionable for the benefit of foreigners.").
"9 Id. at 724.
"0 Id. at 725.
' Id. at 760. Justice Breyer continued his summation of the
majority's holding as follows: "the norm must extend liability to the
type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue ...
Congress can make clear that courts should not recognize any such
norm, through a direct or indirect command or by occupying the field
... The Court also suggests that principles of exhaustion might apply
and that courts should give 'serious weight' to the Executive Branch's
view of the impact on foreign policy thatthe ATS suit will likely have
in a given case or type of case."
112 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738. ("It is enough to hold that a single
illegal detention of less than a day followed by the transfer of custody
to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation
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The Court had several reasons for qualifying what
constituted a cause of action under the ATCA.1 3 First, the
Court stated that because the creation of claims under the
ATCA will result in the creation of new, uniquely federal
common law, such decisions should be made with caution
considering the manner in which the understanding and role
of federal common law has changed since 1789.1" Second,
the Court also noted that its decision seemingly derogated
Court precedent emphasizing Congress' role in the creation
of new causes of action. 15 Third, responding to concerns
expressed by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion, the
Sosa Court instructed lower courts to be wary of the
potential foreign policy ramifications underlying their
decision to create new causes of action under the ATCA.1
6
The Court was also careful to indicate the consequences
of a federal remedy.").
"' Id. at 725-3 1.
114 Id. at 725. (The Court noted that when the ATCA was
drafted, the common law was seen as a "transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until
changed by statute") (quoting Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co.
v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928)) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Court reasoned that the modem
conception that the common law is made, rather than found or
discovered, militated towards exercising restraint in creating new
causes of action under the ATCA. Id. The Court also stated that the
changing conception of the role of the federal courts in making
common law also justified caution with respect to creating causes
action under the ATCA. Id. at 726 (citing Eerie R. Co v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
"' Id. at 727 ("this Court has recently and repeatedly said that
a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to
legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.")
116 Id ("It is one thing for American courts to enforce
constitutional limits on our own State and Federal Governments'
power, but quite another to consider suits under rules that would go so
far as claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own
citizens, and to hold that a foreign government or its agent has
transgressed those limits.").
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that its decision would have on foreign relations, as well as
the relationship between the judiciary and the other
branches of government.1 7  As a whole, the Sosa Court
used the statute's history and current role in modem
jurisprudence to justify giving teeth to the ATCA and
attempted to narrow the potential adverse consequences of
their decision by narrowly drawing the ATCA's scope."1
8
Significantly, the Sosa decision left open the
question of private liability. The Ninth Circuit held that
private individuals, acting in conjunction with United
States officials, could have incurred ATCA liability for
submitting Machain to arbitrary arrest and detention." 9
However, the Supreme Court failed to address that part of
the lower court's opinion. Instead, in a footnote, the Sosa
Court indicated that the spectrum of the debate currently
existed with Tel-Oren at one end and Kadic at the other.'
0
As noted above, the Tel-Oren court decided in 1984 that
insufficient consensus within customary international law
prohibited a private actor's liability for torture.
21
However, in 1995, the Kadic court held that there was
7 See id.
"ie Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 ("[w]hereas Justice Scalia sees these
developments as sufficient to close the door to further independent
judicial recognition of actionable international norms, other
considerations persuade us that the judicial power should be exercised
on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms
today.")
19 Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 331 F.3d 604, 621 (90 Cir. 2003)
(holding that norms prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention are
"codified in every major comprehensive human rights instrument and.
reflected in at least 119 national constitutions.")
'20 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20 ("[a] related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a
private actor such as a corporation or an individual.")
121 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-95.
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sufficient consensus to hold both private and state actors
liable for acts of genocide or war crimes under the
ATCA.122 Consequently, the issue of private liability, and
thus corporate liability, remains unanswered.
1II. THE VALIDITY OF THE STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT
IN ATCA JURISPRUDENCE AFTER SOSA
Having resolved the issue of whether the ATCA
creates a private right of action, the Sosa decision left lower
courts to deal with two separate, equally complex issues.
23
First, as a threshold issue, courts must decide whether the
plaintiff has alleged a violation of a universally accepted
norm of international law. Second, assuming that the
plaintiff has alleged a violation committed by a non-state
actor, the question arises as to whether the state action
requirement precludes jurisdiction under the ATCA. The
Supreme Court's silence on this issue gives occasion to
discuss the legitimacy of the state action requirement. As
will be discussed further below, the state action
requirement lacks legitimacy when analyzed in ATCA
jurisprudence and in the greater context of international
law. This analysis begins by addressing the language of the
ATCA as well as other statutes with extraterritorial
application, and continues by discussing the requirement's
erosion at common law. Further, because modem
international law emphasizes the rights and duties of
private parties, the state action requirement appears curious
and outdated. Finally, this Note draws parallels between
multinational corporate conduct and the paradigm ATCA
'2 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-41.
123 These two issues are, of course, notwithstanding other
related issues discussed in above notes including political question and
act of state, addressed in Kadic, supra note 76; forum non conveniens
addressed in Wiwa, supra note 82; and the correct third party standard
of liability addressed in Doe, supra note 97.
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offense of piracy, and argues against some of the negative
consequences that may result from expanding the ATCA's
scope. There is no principled reason for continuing to
insulate private entities under the language of the ATCA or
international law. Removing the state action requirement
would properly empower the statute to more
comprehensively regulate transnational corporate conduct.
A. The Language of the ATCA and Similar Statutes
The language of the ATCA does not distinguish
between state and private actors.1 24 As stated above, the
state action requirement is the product of federal common
law arising from the Filartiga and Tel-Oren decisions.,
125
Additionally, ATCA jurisprudence has adopted the "color
of law" analysis developed to address violations of civil
rights under 28 U.S.C. §1983 in order to assess whether
non-state actors acted at the behest of, or in concert with,
foreign governments.126 The presumption that the ATCA is
meant only to address state action is belied by the fact that
Congress adopted §1983 to protect individual rights arising
under Constitutional provisions addressing solely official
conduct.
Likewise, other federal statutes with extraterritorial
application do not require a state action trigger. 27  For
example, RICO, which has been utilized in conjunction
'2 28 U.S.C. §1350. Although the Torture Victims Protection
Act, added to original language of the ATCA, requires official action,
the provision was added by Congress as an endorsement of the
Filartiga decision and has been explicitly held inapplicable to the
language of the ATCA. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241.
12 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774;
Collingsworth, supra note 62 and accompanying text.
'26 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
127 See infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
Congiu
156 South Carolina Journal of Vol. 2
International Law and Business 2005 - 2006
with the ATCA on occassion, 128 applies extraterritorially
and does not limit its enforcement solely to state actors.
129
Additionally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
applies to discrimination suffered by U.S. citizens
committed by domestic and foreign corporations abroad.
130
Further, limiting the ATCA solely to official conduct
seemingly derogates the well-settled purpose of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act as "the 'sole basis' of obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in the United
States."131
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA")
offers the clearest and most analogous example of a statute.
with extraterritorial application that is not limited to state
action. Approximately 900,000 people, the vast majority
women and children, are trafficked across international
borders for the purposes of sexual exploitation, involuntary
servitude, peonage, or slavery.132 Although trafficking has
existed for some time, identifying and remedying the
problem has only recently risen to the forefront of the
political, legal, and diplomatic consciousness of the
international community. 33 In 2000, Congress passed the
'z See Doe, 395 F.3d 932.
129 18 U.S.C. §1962 (2000).
130 The 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) ("The term 'employee'
means an individual employed by an employer ... [w]ith respect to
employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who
is a citizen of the United States.")
131 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 611
(1992) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 434-439 (1989)); See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000).
132 U.S. Dept. of State, Trafficking Victims Protection Act of
2000: Trafficking in Persons Report at 7 (2003).
1 See generally Therese Barone, The Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000: Defining the Problem and Creating a Solution,
17 TEMp. INT'L & COMP.L. J. 579 (2003) (discussing the punishment,
protection and prevention aspects of the TVPA); Elizabeth F. Defeis,
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons-A
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TVPA, which provides a comprehensive approach designed
to protect victims of trafficking in the United States and
prosecute individuals involved in trafficking.134 The TVPA
was also drafted to prevent trafficking by imposing
sanctions upon governments who refuse to comply with the
act's "minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking."' 135  Notably, the ability to sanction
governments failing to follow the statute's mandates makes
the TVPA unique and unprecedented among human rights
statutes, thus indicating how serious the United States
Government has become about stamping out this pervasive
and reticulated international problem.1
3 6
In addition to sanctioning sovereign states for their
failure to comply with the act's "minimum standards for
the elimination of trafficking,"'137 the TVPA specifically
empowers the executive branch to punish private
individuals engaged in severe forms of trafficking in
persons.1 38  The U.N. has recognized and attempted to
New Approach, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 485, 491 (2004) (noting
that "trafficking in persons has finally gained the attention of the world
community").C 4 See 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); Trafficking
in Persons Report, supra note 132 at 16.
13' 22 U.S.C. § 7106 (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (setting out the
"minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking").
136 Speaker, Conference of Combating Trafficking in the US,
Canada and Mexico at the Chicago-Kent College of Law (Oct. 14,
2004).
17 22 U.S.C. § 7107(a) (2000)(amended 2003) ("It is the
policy of the United States not to provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-
related foreign assistance to any government that-( 1) does not comply
with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; and (2) is
not making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with such
standards").
13s "The President may exercise the authorities set forth in
section 1702 of Title 50 without regard to section 1701 of Title 50 in
the case of any of the following persons:
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address the problem of trafficking since 1951.139 Most
recently, the U.N. Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime drafted a protocol against trafficking in
2000.140 Although the TVPA only addresses "severe forms
of trafficking," the Palermo Protocol, as it is often referred
to, defines trafficking with the requirement that it be carried
out with the use of threat, fraud, or coercion. 141 "out" was
deleted b/c the protocol does define trafficking specifically
referring to threat, fraud and coercion
The international crime of trafficking, which is
cognizable under international law when undertaken or
facilitated by sovereign states 14
2 and private individuals, 143
is closely analogous to ATCA claims alleging forced labor
and debt bondage. Although trafficking, like forced labor,
may embody a violation of a jus cogens norm that
circumvents the reach of the state action requirement, the
law in this area is anything but settled. The TVPA, which
(A) Any foreign person that plays a significant role in a severe form of
trafficking in persons, directly or indirectly in the United States.
(B) Foreign persons that materially assist in, or provide financial or
technological support for or to, or provide goods or services in support
of, activities of a significant foreign trafficker in persons identified
pursuant to subparagraph (A).
(C) Foreign persons that are owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting
for or on behalf of, a significant foreign trafficker identified pursuant to
subparagraph (A)." 22 USC § 7108(a)(1)(2000).
13 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons
and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, July 25, 1951, 96
U.N.T.S. 271.
140 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, November 15, 2000, 40
I.L.M. 377.
141 Id. at 378 (stating that trafficking may be undertaken by the
use of "deception... abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person").
142 22 U.S.C. § 7107(a).
143 22 U.S.C. § 7108 (a).
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addresses individual human rights abuses like the ATCA, is
free of any common law vagaries like the state action
requirement. 144  Given .the international scope and
application of the TVPA, as well as the extensive
diplomatic implications that would result when foreign
states refuse to comply with its mandates, the TVPA should
be viewed as a congressional recognition of the United
States' important role in international law to defend and
promote individual human rights regardless of state action.
When viewed in this light, and given international law's
current emphasis on individual human rights, requiring
state action under the ATCA appears iniquitous when the
statute fails to distinguish between state and private actors
A. The Erosion of the State Action Requirement at
Common Law
Although the state action requirement finds no basis
in the language of the ATCA, the requirement continues to
be a large hurdle in bringing actions under the ATCA when
private actors commit or are complicit in committing
actions violating the law of nations. However, recent
approaches taken by the Doe and Kadic courts seriously
undermine the significance of the requirement at common
law and further highlight the requirement's illegitimacy.14
5
ATCA defendants have argued that the statute
provides recourse for claims only against governments and
not private parties. 46 However, the current approach is
that a limited number of claims are actionable whether they
allege conduct on behalf of a private or governmental
See 22 U.S.C. 7101.
141 See Doe, 395 F.3d 932; Kadic, 70 F.3d 232..
"6 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242; See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775
(Edwards, concurring).
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party.14 7 The violations of these jus cogens norms have
included slavery, forced labor, genocide, and war crimes.'4
The Doe and Kadic cases provide a way to strip private
actors of their insulation under the state action requirement.
For example, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Doe held that allegations of torture, rape, and
murder could also be actionable under the ATCA without
the requirement of state action because they occurred "in
furtherance of' a forced labor program. 149  In the Kadic
case, the Second Circuit held that claims of torture and
summary execution were actionable against a private actor
because they were committed "in pursuit of genocide and
war crimes."'150  Thus, if a plaintiff can allege one
cognizable or recognized as being so egregious so as to
obviate the need for state action such as slavery, forced
labor, genocide, or war crimes, a plaintiff may also bring
other, less universally accepted claims so long as the
violations alleged occurred in furtherance of one jus cogens
violation.151 Therefore, a private actor may lose the
protection of state action from liability for lesser violations
of international law.
Moreover, the Kadic and Doe courts go beyond the
standard prescribed under §1983. To illustrate, in order to
satisfy the "color of law" standard, a private party must act
in concert with, or with the significant aid of, an official
government. 152 Under the "in furtherance of' standard, a
14' Doe, 395 F.3d at 945-46 (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
794-795).
'4 Doe, 395 F.3d at 946.
149 Id. at 954.
ISO Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244.
151 See generally Doe, 395 F.3d 932; Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
152 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (noting that "[a]ppellants also sufficiently
alleged that Karadlid acted under color of law insofar as they claimed
that he acted in concert with the former Yugoslavia . . . [a] private
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private party may act without the aid of an official actor
provided that his conduct at some point furthers the
violation of ajus cogens norm.'1 3 In other words, the "in
furtherance of" standard allows private and state parties to
act independently of one another so long as the private
party's independent conduct at some point furthers a
violation of a jus cogens norm committed, at least in part,
by a state actor. 154 Thus, the state action requirement has
been whittled down to the point where a private actor may
incur ATCA liability by independent actions not in
violation of a jus cogens norm so long as their conduct
furthers a state-sponsored activity that does violate a jus
cogens norm.155 The requirement's erosion demonstrates
its inappropriate place in ATCA jurisprudence.
individual acts under color of law within the meaning of section 1983
when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid").
113 See Doe, 395 F.3d 932; Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
's See also Craig Forcese, ATCA's Achilles Heel: Corporate
Complicity, International Law and the Alien Tort Claims Act 26 YALE.
J. INT'L. L. 487, 510 (2001) (noting that "like much of the domestic
color of law jurisprudence... state responsibility at international law is
a doctrine linking states to wrongful actions by private parties, rather
than private parties to states" and reasoning that because the vast
majority of ATCA litigation embodies the latter situation, it thus may
be intuitively troublesome to apply a color of law analysis in those
cases).
153 Some commentators have gone so far as to reason that a
private party's "mere presence in a country, coupled with complicity
through silence or inaction" will trigger ATCA liability. Claudia T.
Salazar, Applying International Human Rights Norms in the United
States: Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable in the United
States for International Human Rights Violations under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 111, 139-140 (2004)
(quoting Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremburg to
Rangoon. An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on
the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L
91, 101 (2002)).
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B. The Current State of International Law does not
Indicate the Need for a State Action Requirement
As described above, international law has
undergone a radical transformation in the last fifty years,
moving from a focus on the responsibilities of states to
being primarily concerned with the rights and duties of
individuals under international law. 56 This shift, and the
current emphasis on the role of the individual in
international law, indicates the outdated nature of a state
action requirement in a statute utilized to protect individual
human rights. The Tel-Oren court recognized this issue but
instead chose to require state action because legal
scholarship at that time failed to overwhelmingly
demonstrate that purely private actors could be implicated
under international law.'"
7
Although it is not a great logical leap to view a state
action requirement as somewhat antiquated and
inappropriate in light of the current state of international
law, Sosa's holding, which suggests that a state action
requirement occupies a valid place in ATCA
jurisprudence. 158  Sosa requires courts to look back upon
the paradigms that existed in 1789 and determine whether
a claim is consistent with those eighteenth century norms
prohibiting piracy.159 Thus, because rights and duties under
international law in 1789 were primarily statist, 160 it might
be said that the state action requirement has merit. At the
time the ATCA was drafted, international law was
6 See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
11
7Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794 (noting that "for each article
sounding the arrival of individual rights and duties under the law of
nations, another surveys the terrain and concludes that there is a long
distance to go.").
158 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725
139 Id.
160 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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primarily comprised of a state's responsibilities for its
citizens on the high seas and the provision of judicial
recourse for foreign citizens harmed within its borders.
161
In 1789, individuals could not vindicate their rights under
international law without being represented by their
respective government. 162 As such, it may be argued that
fully exposing private actors under international law
contravenes Sosa's instruction that courts assess ATCA
claims with eighteenth century paradigms in mind.
163
However, although the Sosa test is historical, the
paradigms that existed in 1789 included private actors.
1M
For example, William Blackstone noted that international
law offenders included official actors, private actors, and
those who had ventured beyond the public/private
dichotomy into the "savage state of nature," like pirates.
65
Significantly, English common law, which was a dominant
component of the paradigms existing at the time of the
ATCA's drafting, exercised jurisdiction only over private
actors and actors within the 'savage state of nature.
' 66
Therefore, private liability was part of the paradigms
existent in 1789.
Moreover, although the Sosa test requires a
historical analysis, it is not apparent that the Sosa holding
requires consistency with respect to the offenders
historically implicated under common law. To illustrate,
Sosa requires that the claim, not the offender, be consistent
161 id.
162 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
'66 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20 (comparing the differences
between the Tel-Oren and Kadic decisions).
M64 See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
165 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 71.
166 Eugene Kotorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain: What Piracy Reveals about the Limits of the Alien Tort
Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 111, 148 (2004).
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with the norms prohibiting piracy in the eighteenth
century. 67 Thus, Sosa's historical analysis does not require
that the offenders implicated match those implicated under
common law in 1789. Therefore, given that the paradigms
existent in 1789 included private actors, the current
emphasis of international law on private rights and duties
further suggests the state action requirement's
inappropriateness under international law.
C. The Similarities Between Private Liability and the
Paradigm A TCA Offense of Piracy
The paradigm offense under international law as
contemplated by William Blackstone and the Sosa Court
was piracy. 168 In fact, any claim after Sosa must be
consistent with the paradigms and circumstances that
characterized a piracy claim in 1789.169 Thus, an
examination of those archetypes sheds light on the
circumstances that must characterize claims after Sosa.
Pirates were private actors.1 70 Their conduct, by its
very nature, rejected state sponsorship as well as the
protection of state citizenship under international law.'
7'
167 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
16 Id. at 760; see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES
68; Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (interpreting the
original version of the ATCA to provide jurisdiction to adjudicate a
claim involving stolen slaves on the high seas). The Second Circuit, in
Kadic, stated: "[a]n early example of the application of the law of
nations to the acts of private individuals is the prohibition against
piracy." 70 F.3d at 239 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161
(1820); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 196-197 (1820); The
Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844)).
169 SOSa, 542 U.S. at .725.
170 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 236 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that acts of piracy, by definition, are
carried out for purely private ends).
171 Kontorovich, supra note 166, at 149 n.166 (quoting 4
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Accordingly, a pirate's criminal activity placed him in
Blackstone's third category of international law offenders
that had entered into the "savage state of nature."'172 Thus,
because a pirate's conduct was anathema to the diplomatic
responsibilities of civilized nation-states under international
law in 1789, prosecuting a pirate resulted in little more than
diplomatic indifference. 173  This unique status of pirates
under international law in 1789 suggests that the ATCA's
drafters contemplated that violations of the law of nations
included torts solely committed by private parties.
The fact that the paradigm offense under the ATCA
involves a uniquely stateless private party begs the
conclusion that private parties under modern international
law should be held similarly liable. After Sosa, only
certain international crimes that have an acceptance as
widespread as those prohibiting piracy will be actionable
under the ATCA. 174 Thus, given that prohibiting piracy in
1789 required the prosecution of private parties, private
actors should also be held liable in modern ATCA
jurisprudence.
Currently, the state action requirement exists for
some, but not all, violations of international law under the
ATCA.175 However, the Sosa Court specifically limited the
number of international crimes under the ATCA to those
Blackstone Commentaries at 71) (explaining that "pirates were
universally punishable because 'they renounced all the benefits of
society and government"').
172 id.
17 Id. at 146 (noting that prosecuting pirates "reduced the
chances that prosecution would cause interstate hostilities" whereas
punishing a foreign official was "perceived as a grave insult by his
government, and an interference with his nation's sovereignty").
'74 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring).
'7s See Doe, 395 F.3d 932.
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which violate norms that are universal and obligatory.
176
Like pirates, modem-day international criminals, whether
they take the form of traffickers, slaveholders, terrorists, or
rapists, surrender the protection of their sovereign
citizenship by virtue of their criminal activity in violation
of a norm under international law.177  As such, no
principled reason exists to insulate private parties under the
ATCA when they commit an international crime that meets
the Sosa test.
The issue of private liability under the ATCA
cannot be addressed without discussing corporate liability.
Scholars have argued that unlike pirates, corporations
operate under the protection and to the benefit of nations in
which they do business; 178 however, corporations do have
some of the same distinctive characteristics as pirates.
Although they may operate to the economic benefit of
nation-states, they often do so at the expense of individual
human rights in countries that lack the legal infrastructure
to hold them accountable for their actions. 79 Corporations
have legal personalities that transcend national boundaries
and can assume the benefits and protections of aparticular
nation's laws in a uniquely self-interested way.' In that
6 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
177 This is best exemplified by the TVPA's authority to
sanction foreign persons engaged in the international crime of
trafficking discussed above. See supra notes 133-145 and
accompa7ing text.
8 Kontorovich, supra note 166, at 158 (arguing that ATCA
litigation differs from piracy because corporations "have not foresworn
the protection of their home states[,]" and their litigation in American
courts would cause great concern to the home governments).
'9v See Salazar, supra note 155, at 153 (arguing that although
multinationals' investment into underdeveloped countries does increase
gross domestic product, "it is illogical to argue that the simple creation
of an economic right negates respecting an individual's human rights").
1s0 Baker, supra note 39, at 95 (arguing that, in the last fifty
years, multinational corporations "forced the liberalization of trade
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sense, corporations have, at least in part, both stateless and
lawless qualities.' 8' Although corporations operate with the
help of, or in concert with, the governments of host
countries, this connection is often difficult to prove.
182
Moreover, the power of multinational corporations,
or the pervasive effect they have on the nation-states in
which they operate, cannot be understated.8 3 The largest
multinational corporations have revenues greater than most
countries' gross domestic products. 184  Corporate entities,
because of their wealth and the economic benefits their
operations bring to host countries, are often able to
politically control nation-states starved for their business.1
8 5
structures," moved production to the underdeveloped world to cut costs
and have consolidated internationally to form "massive entities in spite
of antitrust regulations").
181 Brad J. Kieserman, Profits and Principles: Promoting
Multinational Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 881, 931 (1999) ("'[A] corporation is
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it."')
(quoting Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,
636 (1819)).
'82See Doe, 395 F.3d 932 (illustrating the practical difficulties
in tracing the connection between state action and corporate conduct).
Logan Michael Breed, Regulating Our 21st Century
Ambassadors: A New Approach to Corporate Liability for Human
Rights Violations Abroad, 42 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1005, 1007-1008 (2002)
(noting that American multinational corporations have acquired an
enormous amount of international economic and political power);
Kieserman, supra note 181, at 931 (noting that multinational
corporations are "transcending and transforming the nations that
spawned them")
18 Breed, supra note 183, at 1007 (citing Glen Kelley,
Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to
Multinational Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 506
(2001)).
18 Baker, supra note 39, at 94.
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Corporations use their wealth as a "bargaining chip" to pit
nations, including the United States, against one another in
competition for their business.
86 This race to the bottom'8 7
often results ultimately in the corporate exploitation of
underdeveloped countries' natural resources and labor.
1 88
Multinational corporations, in addition to
transcending the boundaries of the nation-states in which
they operate, have greater political and economic power
than many sovereign states.' 89 This power has allowed
multinationals to operate without regard to the cultural,
economic, and political rights of the populations of the
countries in which they do business.' 90 Without any valid
mechanism to restrain their conduct, corporations function
purely as economic self-serving entities concerned only
with their bottom line. 191 This reality is illustrated by
ATCA litigation as well as by the evils more generally
associated with economic globalization. 192  Specifically,
some argue that the lack of effective mechanisms seriously
endangers the environment, undermines employee health
and safety standards, and leads to a greater polarization of
18 Id. at 95-96 (arguing that multinational corporations'
international influence also increases their domestic power and stating:
"[multinational corporations] may have the upper hand in coaxing their
own States to lessen its restrictions to attract [multinational
corporations'] business").
187 The author uses the phrase "race to the bottom" to refer to a
common term of art used in context of globalization where
corporations force countries, through bidding wars for their business, to
lower their labor standards or acquiesce to disregard local labor laws.
188 Baker, supra note 39, at 95-96.
'89 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190 Baker, supra note 39, at 95 (noting the multinational
corporations' wealth allows them to "dominate not just economic but
also political structures of individualized nations and transnational
organizations").
191 See generally id.
192id.
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wealth between the developed and undeveloped world.' 93
Commentators have urged that holding multinationals
liable under international law would curb many of the
negative ramifications of economic globalization.
194
Indeed, it must be acknowledged that corporations, as
profit-seeking entities, would respond to the costs and
consequences of litigation.
In sum, multinational corporations, like pirates,
operate independently of the nation-states that they purport
to represent and often outside international legal norms.'
95
Corporations exhibit the piratical instincts of self-serving
economic gain while having the benefit of political and
economic power that rivals sovereign states. This
dangerous combination has led to a great mass of ATCA
litigation involving plaintiffs alleging human rights
violations at the hands of multinational corporations.
196
One of the most significant hurdles of this litigation has
centered on the plaintiffs' inability to circumvent the state
action requirement. 197 As such, the continued validity of
the state action requirement will be a key component of
corporate liability in future ATCA litigation. The purpose
'93 Id at 97-106.
194 Salazar, supra note 155, at 155-156 (arguing that holding
multinational corporations "accountable under the ATCA will aid in
furthering the goals of international law, particularly human rights
norms"); See generally Baker, supra note 39; Breed, supra note 183, at
1006.
' 95 See NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND
BULLIES 340 (Picador 2000) ("[w]e have read (or heard about) how a
handful of powerful CEOs are writing the new rules for the global
economy,.. . citizens must go after corporations not because we don't
like their products, but because corporations have become the ruling
political bodies of our era, setting the agenda of globalization. We must
confront them, in other words, because that is where the power is"); see
also supra note 187-188 and accompanying text.
96 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
197 See generally Collingsworth, supra note 62, at 197-200.
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of this Note is to flesh out the relatively weak reasons that
private parties, and thus corporations, are currently
protected under the ATCA. With the uniquely pervasive
and immense power of multinationals in mind, this Note
will conclude by examining the potential negative
implications of removing the state action requirement from
the ATCA.
D. The Implications of Removing the State Action
Requirement from A TCA Litigation
Removing the barrier to private liability under the
ATCA may arguably have negative implications. Echoing
the concerns of Judge Bork in Tel-Oren, it has been said
that widening the ATCA's application to private defendants
would further intrude on the executive branch's role as the
arbiter of foreign relations.' 98  Indeed, the Bush
administration vigorously contends that ATCA cases
threaten U.S. foreign policy and that such cases must be
dismissed pursuant to the act of state or political question
doctrines.'" Although the judiciary's decisions in cases
involving human rights abuses committed by multinational
corporations may affect foreign policy, this argument
forgets that the ATCA specifically grants the federal
judiciary power to hear cases that by definition are
international in scope. 00  This argument similarly
overlooks that Congress has also provided the federal
198 "The crucial element of the doctrine of separation of
powers in this case is the principle that '[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative ... "' Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (quoting
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
199 Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation 17 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 169, 184 (2004) (outlining the Bush Administration's
reasons for limiting ATCA litigation).
20- 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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judiciary the power to hear cases under a myriad of statutes
that have similar potential to create negative foreign policy
ramifications. 20 1 For example, the judiciary is empowered
under the Torture Victims Protection Act to hear cases
against foreign governments, or their agents, for the
international law violations of torture and extrajudicial
killing.20 2  Moreover, in Sosa the Supreme Court
specifically acknowledged and rejected the argument that
the potential for negative foreign policy implications
evinced the conclusion that the ATCA should not provide
for a federal private right of action.20 3
Thus, removing the state action requirement to
make way for private liability is consistent with the
Supreme Court's expansion of the ATCA's power in spite
of separation of powers objections. Clearly, the separation
of powers objections originally raised by Judge Bork in
Tel-Oren2 0 and revisited by the Sosa Court, were primarily
concerned with the conduct of sovereign states and not
private parties. 20 5 In other words, the Court was concerned
with the diplomatic consequences of defining the limits of
another sovereign's conduct, not with defining the
responsibilities of a private party under international law.
206
Seemingly, defining the rights of a private corporation
201 See infra note 202.
202 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Stephens, supra note 198, at 184-85.
Statutes like Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and RICO,
because of their extraterritorial application, are also examples of
Congress granting the Judiciary the right to hear cases that implicate
foreign policy. 28 U.S.C. §1962; 42 U.S.C. § 702(b) (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§ 702(b) (2000).
203 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (reasoning that modem international
law "is very much concerned" with questions regarding the conduct of
foreign governments).
204 Tel-Oren, 70 F.2d at 801.
2o See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
2S6 $osa, 542 U.S. at 727.
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under international law would, in most cases, be less
constitutionally offensive than defining the responsibilities
of other sovereigns.20 7  Although both may provoke
diplomatic responses, the latter strikes at the heart of the
political question and act of state doctrines.208  Thus, the
argument that removing the state action requirement would
create a new, more offensive inroad into the Executive
Branch's role as the arbiter of foreign relations is
misplaced.2 °9
Additionally, some may argue that removing the
state action requirement would dangerously expand the
ATCA's power. As a corollary, endorsing private liability
under the ATCA might chill foreign investment or
otherwise create negative economic consequences.
However, although removing the state action requirement
might empower courts to hear a greater number of ATCA
cases, it is unclear whether removing the state action
requirement will have a dramatic effect. To illustrate,
removing the state action requirement does nothing to
expand the types of claims actionable under the ATCA.21°
Rather, removing the requirement would simply expand the
"7 See Tel-Oren, 70 F.2d at 805. Judge Bork acknowledged
that a non-state actor may "diminish" any potential interference with
foreign relations but argued that the case could be dismissed pursuant
to the doctrines of political question or act of state because the "PLO
bears significantly upon the foreign relations of the United States." Id.
208 Id. at 803-804; see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250 ("it would be
a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit under [the
ATCA]").
209 Kadic, 70.F3d at 249 (reasoning that "[niot every case
'touching foreign relations' is nonjusticiable," and that judges should
be allowed the flexibility "to weigh carefully the relevant
considerations on a case-by-case basis" thus allowing the judiciary to
"act where appropriate in light of the express legislative mandate of the
Congress in section 1350, without compromising the primacy of the
political branches in foreign affairs.")210 See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
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types of defendants who may be sued.21' Plaintiffs will still
have to plead a violation of "the law of nations." 2 This
difficult threshold, as well as the fact that the Supreme
Court in Sosa drew the scope of actionable claims under the
ATCA so narrowly, seriously tempers any argument that
the removal of the state action requirement will result in a
flood of ATCA cases.213 Moreover, as argued above, the
current erosion of the state action requirement at common
law2 14 suggests that the "floodgates" of private liability
may have already have been opened.215
Notwithstanding those arguments, it remains that
any negative economic impact resulting from the removal
of the state action requirement should be swallowed as a
matter of necessity. Multinational corporations maintain a
uniquely pervasive and powerful place in global society.
216
These corporations use their economic and political capital
to increase their profit margins at the expense of local
environments and fundamental human rights. 217  Valid
effective mechanisms for regulating corporate conduct do
not currently exist. 21 8  Furthermore, no effective and
comprehensive code of corporate conduct exists.
21 9
211 See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
212 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
2 13 id.
214 See supra notes 146-156 and accompanying text.
215 See Baker, supra note 39, at 110 (reasoning that in light of
the Doe decision "the floodgates have opened for private individuals..
to be held tortiously liable under the ATCA for human rights
abuses").
216 See notes 184-194 and accompanying text.217 Kieserman, supra note 181, at 882.
218 Id. at 881-883. For a broad overview of the failed attempts
to curb corporate malfeasance, see Baker, supra note 39.
219 Keiserman, supra note 181, at 883 (citing Barbara A. Frey,
The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 153, 159 (1997)).
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Domestic sanctions and regional efforts have been similarly
unsuccessful. 220 As such, multinational corporations "have
grown beyond the control of national governments and
operate in a legal and moral vacuum." 221 Corporate power,
as well as unregulated relationships between corporations
and foreign governments, strongly suggests that there is a
need for valid enforcement mechanisms. 222 Removing the
state action requirement would allow the ATCA to regulate
corporate conduct more comprehensively. As such, the
potential for negative economic consequences to
multinational corporations should not undermine the
ATCA's potential to serve as a mechanism for corporate
regulation. The creation of economic consequences may be
the only way to significantly change the conduct of
corporate entities concerned solely with their own
economic well-being.
CONCLUSION
A considerable amount of recent human rights
scholarship has focused on the need to have valid
enforcement mechanisms for human rights established
under international covenants such as the U.N. Charter and
the Covenant on Economic, Civil and Political Rights.
223
Although much scholarship has focused on expanding
corporate liability under the ATCA,224 very little has been
22 0 ld at 884.
21 Id. at 883 (quoting Robert J. Fowler, International
Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations 25 ENVT'L.
L. 1, 2 (1995)).
222 See generally Collingsworth, supra note 62.
23 See e.g., id.
n See Salazar, supra note 155; Collingsworth, supra note 62;
Baker, supra note 39; Kieserman, supra note 181; Shaw, supra note 52;
Forcese, supra note 154. The foregoing articles are a small part of the
scholarship insisting that the ATCA have greater power to regulate
corporate activity.
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said about removing the state action requirement from
ATCA jurisprudence. The ATCA has failed thus far to
provide adequately for the remedial protection of rights
recognized under international law.225 Although the state
action requirement cannot be blamed for this failure, taking
down this illegitimate barrier between public and private
liability would allow the ATCA to regulate more
expansively transnational corporate conduct. Doing so
would conform with the language of the ATCA and similar
statutes. It would also be consistent with the current state
of international law and the paradigm offense of piracy as it
was understood by the first Congress. The ATCA has, by
rather inadvertent means, grown into a potentially powerful
statutory tool. It is time that courts acknowledge the
relatively weak reasons that private actors continue to be
insulated and allow the ATCA to impose responsibilities on
multinational corporations commensurate with their
economic and political power.
225 See Terry Collingsworth, Separating Fact from Fiction in
the Debate over the Application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights by Corporations, 37 U.S. F.
L. REv. 563, 566 (2003) (reasoning that only corporations that are
knowing participants in state-sponsored and egregious human rights
violations may face liability under the ATCA).
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